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Abstract 
 
How fluidity of political party systems affects legislative oversight and worldwide governance indica-
tors? Based on the analyses of 47 Sub-Saharan African countries, this article seeks to explore the cor-
relation between Legislative Oversight and Worldwide Governance Indicators as well as the effects of 
Party System Fluidity on WGI and legislative oversight. Needless to mention, that the effects of party 
systems fluidity on governance indicators and legislative oversight have received little systematic 
scholarly attention. To fill the gap in the existing literature, the article explores how in/stability of 
party systems affects governance indicators and legislative oversight capacity in Sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries. Analyzing the data on 47 Sub-Saharan African countries we find that legislative over-
sight has a strong positive relationship with Worldwide Governance Indicators, however, instability 
of political party systems expressed in high party systems fluidity has a negative relationship with 
legislative oversight as well as all six dimensions of WGI. These findings reaffirm that the stability of 
political party systems is a crucial factor that is essential for the development of democratic institu-
tions and further evolvement of mechanisms of democratic control of Parliaments over the work of 
national Governments. The article is structured in the following way: The first part analyzes how ac-
ademic scholarship defines legislative oversight and party system fluidity. The second part presents 
our data analysis methods. In conclusion, the paper discusses the key findings of the research, namely 
the effects of party systems fluidity on legislative oversight and WGI, in the context of Sub-Saharan 
African countries.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Can we assume that national Parlia-
ments, in particular in developing coun-
tries use legislative oversight tools to con-
trol the work of governments?. Academic 
scholarship draws attention to the prob-
lem of declining trust in the institution of 
political parties worldwide. Reasons of 
such sowing distrust to political parties 
might be different: e.g. high dependence 
of political parties from the state (both 
legally and financially) rather than from 
the society (Van Biezen & Kopecky , 2007, 
p.248), the development of new technolo-
gies that make direct communication be-
tween citizens and the state authorities 
easier, therefore the institute of political 
parties is seen as a rather archaic institu-
tion. In addition, corruption scandals 
(Transparency International, 2019) and 
doubts that political party representatives 
lobbying for the interests of political elites 
and large scale bussiness rather than of 
citizens also further to a decrease in trust 
to the very idea of parliamentarism and 
parliamentarian democracy. In the con-
text of developing countries such as Sub-
Saharan African countries additional con-
cern is related to the emergence of ethnic-
based political parties which in the con-
text of multiethnic societies lead to the 
emergence of ethnic-based societal cleav-
ages. As the researcher, Kimathi (2010) 
pointed out, ethnicity, not ideology, deter-
mines party loyalty, party affiliation and 
ultimately party and political dominance. 
The ruling class has been able to manipu-
late ethnicity in such a way as to present 
its political fortunes as synonymous with 
those of its ethnic group (Kimathi, 2010). 
Therefore, political parties serve as 
an instrument for promotion of interests 
of those ethnic groups belonging to the 
“ruling class”, while the interests of other 
ethnic groups might be underrepresent-
ed. All these factors, such as corruption 
scandals involving political parties repre-
sentatives, ethnic fractionalization and 
underrepresentativeness of interests of 
certain (ethnic) groups within the popula-
tion lead to the loss of credibility to the 
institute of political parties in eyes of the 
electorate.  
Despite all these negative factors, 
the Parlianment remains the key actor to 
which the power of holding Governments 
accountable is granted. Instruments of 
democratic control of the Parliament over 
the work of national Governments are 
quite comprehensive and include differ-
ent legislative oversight tools such as: 
“committee hearings, hearing in plenary 
sessions of the parliament, the creation of 
a commission of inquiry, questions, the 
ombudsman, auditors general, and the 
public account committees”(Pelizzo & Sta-
penhurst, 2004). Therefore, despite all 
doubts and suspicion, the role of national 
Parliaments and their legislative over-
sight capacities should not be underesti-
mated.  
 However reasonable questions may 
arise as to what extent Parliaments in Sub
-Saharan African countries are using leg-
islative oversight tools? Academic schol-
arship defines different factors that might 
affect oversight effectiveness, except po-
litical (forms of the government, the level 
of democracy), economic (the level of in-
come) (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004; 
Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2013), also cultur-
al (or contextual) factors such as shared 
norms, values, traditions, moral (Sartori, 
2005) may exert influence on legislative 
oversight effectiveness. Based on this un-
derstanding of the importance of contex-
tual factors we hypothesize that in/
stability of party systems or using 
(Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2015) terminology 
party systems “fluidity” impacts both on 
legislative oversight as well as on govern-
ance indicators.  
However, before dwelling our atten-
tion on the exploration of these relation-
ships, it is essential to analyze the ques-
tion of how academic scholarship defines 
legislative oversight as well as party sys-
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tems fluidity. 
Literature Review 
How academic scholarship defines 
legislative oversight?. In Functionalist 
Theory of Oversight (2015) the research-
ers Kinyondo, Pelizzo and Umar define 
legislative oversight as an instrument, 
through which the overseer (Parliament) 
seeks explanation and information from 
the overseen (Government); through 
which the overseen describes, explains 
and ultimately accounts for its actions 
and decisions to the overseer”(Kinyondo 
et.al, 2015).  
Therefore, legislative oversight is seen 
not just as a control mechanism but also 
as a communication tool between the Par-
liament and the Government. In their ear-
lier study Pelizzo and Stapenhusrt (2004) 
Tools of Legislative Oversight as well 
study dated (2012) on Parliamentary 
Oversight Tools provide quite a compre-
hensive overview capturing not just dif-
ferent legislative oversight tools but in 
addition, the analysis of factors that might 
affect legislative oversight capacity and its 
effectiveness, such as the form of govern-
ance (parliamentarian, presidential, semi-
presidential; and the level of democracy) 
as well as economic factors as the levels 
of income.  
The researchers differentiating various 
typologies of legislative oversight tools 
such as ex-ante and ex-post as well as in-
ternal and external oversight tools. Name-
ly, while introducing the time dimension, 
ex-ante legislative oversight tools could 
be considered as instruments used by the 
Parliament before: “the government en-
acts specific policies”(Pelizzo & Sta-
penhurst, 2004). At this initial stage, the 
Parliament uses oversight tools before 
specific policies implementation in order 
to get clarification from the Government 
concerning different aspects of these poli-
cies. Such ex-ante legislative oversight 
tools include: committee hearings, ques-
tions (in oral and written forms) ad-
dressed to the Government etc. while ex-
post oversight tools are those instru-
ments of control used by the Parliament 
when certain policies are already in the 
process of their implementation or are 
already being implemented, such over-
sight tools include public account commit-
tees and the ombudsman, anti-corruption 
agencies, etc. 
Scholars, in addition, classify the 
same legislative oversight tools to inter-
nal and external oversight tools, depend-
ing on whether these tools: “established 
inside or outside of the Parlia-
ment” (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004). Fol-
lowing this logic, internal oversight tools 
comprise of: “committees and special 
commissions of inquiry, review of ap-
pointments and power to censure/
impeach/dismiss, chamber proceedings: 
questions and interpellation and plenary, 
debates” (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2012), 
while external tools encompass special 
institutions of external control created 
outside of the Parliament as Anti-
corruption agencies, Ombuds offices, etc. 
In these early works, the researchers 
focused mainly on the dependence of 
oversight capacities from various political 
and economic factors. Pelizzo & Sta-
penhurst (2004; 2012) have found that 
oversight capacity (the number of legisla-
tive oversight tools) depends on the form 
of the government as well as the level of 
democracy and the level of income of 
those countries. In their work dated back 
2004, the researchers found that: 
“parliamentarian systems are better 
equipped –in terms of oversight tools- 
than legislatures in either presidential or 
semi-presidential systems” (Pelizzo & Sta-
penhurst, 2004). 
However, just the form of the gov-
ernment and the number of oversight 
tools cannot explain why some countries 
more advanced in using legislative over-
sight tools rather than others. For in-
stance, Gabon and Mali possess seven 
oversight tools while Angola just three 
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(Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004), all these 
three sub-Saharan African countries have 
a semi-presidential form of the govern-
ment. Thus, this fact signifies that not just 
the form of the government but other fac-
tors might affect oversight capacity and 
oversight effectiveness. 
According to the researchers, the 
level of democracy impacts oversight po-
tential. The authors found that: “Non-
democratic countries have an average of 
only 5 oversight tools, while democratic 
6.41” (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004). At 
the same time, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 
admit that there is no clear uni-
directional causality between the depend-
ent (legislative oversight) and independ-
ent variable (the level of democracy), 
therefore it is hard to bypass the problem 
of reverse causality. As one may argue a 
greater number of oversight tools can ap-
pear and function in more democratic ra-
ther than in non-democratic countries as 
the environment to nurture potential of 
legislative oversight is absent in the latter. 
Not solely political but also econom-
ic factors could affect legislative capacity, 
namely the level of income. The research-
ers pointed out: “In fact, the Parliaments 
in low-income countries have on average 
a much smaller number of oversight tools 
at their disposal rather than their coun-
terparts in both middle and high-income 
countries”(Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004). 
Understanding all caveats and prob-
lems related to reverse causality, the re-
searchers in their latter studies go beyond 
this and emphasize that not just a form of 
the government or the level of democracy 
but also other factors e.g. most important-
ly availability/or absence of the political 
will explains why some Sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries are more effective in using 
legislative oversight tools than others. 
However, how to measure legislative 
oversight effectiveness? In 2015 research-
ers Pelizzo, Kinyondo and Umar pub-
lished the article entitled A Functionalist 
Theory of Oversight where they pro-
foundly analyzed the question of how to 
measure oversight effectiveness and em-
phasized that: “to more adequately under-
standing oversight effectiveness a multi-
dimensional approach is more appropri-
ate rather than the unidimensional ones 
adopted in previous studies” (Kinyondo 
et.al, 2015)  
The researchers argue not just polit-
ical, economic but also other aspects are 
crucial, hence not the number of oversight 
tools (legislative capacity) but rather the 
context in which communication between 
the overseer and overseen is taking place 
is important. In this regards not only for-
mal legal provisions like Constitution, le-
gal acts but also informal institutions such 
as shared values, morals, traditions are of 
great importance. 
Therefore the combination of politi-
cal, economic and cultural (contextual) 
factors might exert influence on legisla-
tive oversight effectiveness as well as po-
litical party systems development.  
While emphasizing that contextual 
factors are important we would like to 
suggest that party systems fluidity may 
also exert influence on legislative over-
sight. However, let us first consider how 
academic scholarship defines party sys-
tems as well as party systems fluidity (or 
instability of party systems). 
We have mentioned earlier that leg-
islative oversight effectiveness depends 
on contextual factors between overseer 
and overseen, e.g. values they share. Polit-
ical parties could also be considered as 
institutions formed on shared values. For 
instance, Leisersoff argues that: “parties 
can be observed as organizational groups, 
as idea groups, and as social 
groups” (Sartori, 2005). The same could 
be said about party systems. According to 
Sartori that the organizational network of 
parties goes far beyond the party itself, 
for it includes all the space that a party is 
able to occupy de facto, and no matter un-
der which form, in whatever set-
ting”(Sartori, 2005). 
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Giovanni Sartori in his pioneering 
work in the field on Parties and Party Sys-
tems (1976) goes beyond Duverger's 
(1954) consideration of “anatomic struc-
ture” of political parties and drew atten-
tion to the political party systems change 
(Sartori, 2005) 
Needless to mention, that Duverger 
(1954) while focusing on political parties 
organizational structure, less attention 
paid to the party systems or contextual 
environment in which parties emerge and 
function. Duverger was more interested 
in studies of inner structure of political 
parties and suggests different typologies 
of political parties as parties societies i.e. 
associational parties of the loose Gesell-
schaft type: community like parties of the 
Gemeinschaft type, and devotee parties of 
the Bund type” (Sartori, 2005). Party sys-
tems Duverger categorized, “on the basis 
of the number of political parties and 
identifies one party, two and multiple par-
ty systems” (Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2016). 
Sartori goes beyond Duvergers nu-
meric typologies in the classification of 
party systems and emphasized that party 
systems can be classified not by a number 
of parties but rather based on the number 
of “relevant” parties. Sartori suggested 
seven types of political party systems: 
those with one relevant party: such as one 
party, hegemonic party and predominant 
party; with two relevant parties which 
form two-party systems: and those having 
more than two relevant political parties, 
which in their turn also could be classified 
as moderate pluralist party systems 
(having between 3-5 political parties) and 
polarized pluralist party systems (with 
more than five political parties) (Pelizzo 
& Nwokora, 2016). 
An additional important aspect in 
Sartori's works (2005) is the introduction 
of the time dimension in political party 
system studies, the researcher underlined 
the significance of studies of: “historical 
patterns from which political parties orig-
inated” (Sartori, 2005). 
This idea of including the time di-
mension in the party system studies 
served as fertile ground for the emer-
gence of recent studies on party systems 
dynamics and elaboration of Indexes 
measuring party systems volatility and 
fluidity (Pedersen, 1979; Pelizzo & 
Nwokora, 2015).  
Developed by Pedersen (1979) the 
volatility index computes: “the net change 
in parties vote or seat totals between elec-
tion” (Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2016). Howev-
er present index of volatility has certain 
limitations, as units of analysis, it consid-
ers political parties but not party systems 
and: “the Index is calculated across all 
parties, not just for relevant parties. Thus, 
a party system can be moderately or high-
ly volatile, although the vote returns of 
relevant parties remain stable”(Nwokora 
& Pelizzo, 2017). 
In 2015 the researchers Pelizzo and 
Nwokora elaborated on the Index of Party 
systems fluidity which encompasses such 
components as Frequency, Scope, and Va-
riety of Party System change. Through the 
calculation of the Frequency=Number of 
Party System Changes/Number of Elec-
tions; Scope= Distance between the two 
most different types; as well as Variety= 
number of Different Type Changes this 
index allows to capture the dynamics of 
party systems change over the time as 
well as “stability of polity party sys-
tems” (Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2018) 
The novelty and significance of the 
Index of Party systems fluidity is that it 
addresses gaps and limitations of previ-
ous studies aimed to capture the dynam-
ics of party system change. Following Sar-
tori s logic the time dimension plays also 
a crucial role, as the Index allows to cap-
ture the dynamics of party system change. 
Therefore it can be considered as a useful 
analytical tool for party system change 
studies and also for comparative public 
policy studies. Namely measuring fre-
quency, scope, and variety of party sys-
tem changes: “during the historic period 
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T1 through to T10” it is possible to calcu-
late how countries A and B underwent 
different types of changes, e.g. let say 
country A underwent one type system 
change from: “the hegemonic type to two-
partyism at T3, while country B under-
went two changes from moderate plural-
ism to polarized pluralism at T3, and from 
polarized pluralism back to moderate plu-
ralism at T6” (Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2017). 
Thus, considering not parties but 
party systems as units of analysis the In-
dex of fluidity (Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2015) 
allows to capture party system changes as 
well as to conduct cross-country compar-
ative analysis covering different time-
frameworks, countries and regions. 
Thinking about party systems they 
are usually perceived as some static enti-
ties however, fluidity index allows to ex-
plore the dynamics in party systems 
changes, this is in particular important in 
the context of developing countries where 
just before the election may appear differ-
ent parties which after elections could 
stop functioning or are not that active as 
during the elections. One additional ad-
vantage of this index as it computes not 
the number of parties but the party sys-
tem change based on consideration in 
changes using Sartori terminology of the 
number of relevant parties. 
While coming to the conclusion that 
party systems stability is essential for 
good governance, Pelizzo (2018) in his 
recent work entitled The Determinants of 
Party System Change in Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca explores in addition what are the fac-
tors affecting party system change. The 
study findings are: “ethnic fragmentation, 
urbanization, and development have no 
detectable impact on the stability of party 
systems, but poverty can greatly under-
mine the stability of party sys-
tems”(Pelizzo, 2018). 
Based on findings of Pelizzo & Sta-
penhust on legislative oversight and In-
dex of party System Fluidity (Pelizzo & 
Nwokora, 2015) this work seeks to con-
tribute to the existing literature by ex-
ploring the questions: how Legislative 
oversight affects Worldwide Governance 
Indicators as well as how Party Systems 
Fluidity affects Legislative Oversight and 
WGI, in the context of Sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries.  
RESEARCH METHODS 
For this research, we used Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU) dataset. “IPU 
is a global organization of national parlia-
ments with 179 member Parliaments. The 
IPU open database platform Pauline is a 
unique open database platform, which 
allows us to study and to compare data on 
national parliaments” (IPU: 2019) This 
database comprises a broad range of data 
related to legislative oversight.  In order 
to answer the first research question how 
legislative oversight affects Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, we take IPU data 
on 47 Sub-Saharan African countries such 
as the number of written questions asked 
per year, the number of written questions 
answered by the government per year, 
after we calculated the percentage of 
written questions answered by the gov-
ernment per year.  
The IPU database gives a possibility 
for scholars to explore the dynamics and 
changes in the data over time (for in-
stance, as for some countries the data for  
2012 were missing we take the available 
data for some of Sub-Saharan African 
countries for 2008, 2010, 2011 and 
2013). Advantage of the IPU database that 
the data comes directly from national Par-
liaments which makes IPU database a 
very helpful data source for the studying 
of the work of national parliaments glob-
ally, regionally or locally. In addition we 
used Worldwide Governance Indicators 
for each 47 Sub-Saharan African countries 
in all six dimensions of WGI, namely Con-
trol of Corruption, Voice and Accountabil-
ity, Political Stability, Rule of Law, Gov-
ernment Effectiveness and Regulatory 
Quality (for 2012).   
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To explore the second and third research 
questions of this paper on the relation-
ship between party systems fluidity and 
WGI as well as the fluidity and legislative 
oversight Index of Fluidity scores for each 
of 47 Sub-Saharan African countries were 
used, these data on scores of each of 47 
Sub-Saharan African countries were kind-
ly provided by Riccardo Pelizzo. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
At the beginning, we have pointed 
out that this paper seeks to explore the 
relationship between 1) legislative over-
sight and WGI; 2) Party Systems Fluidity 
and Legislative Oversight and 3) Fluidity 
and WGI. Our analysis reveals a strong 
positive correlation between Legislative 
Oversight and Worldwide Governance In-
dicators, meaning that the increase in leg-
islative oversight leads to increase of co-
efficients in each of six dimensions of gov-
ernance indicators. These results signify 
that legislative oversight is an essential 
condition for government effectiveness. 
We hypothesized that party systems' 
fluidity might impact the legislative over-
sight. The results of our regression model 
show that there is a negative correlation 
between fluidity and legislative oversight, 
namely, the higher is party systems fluidi-
ty (instability) the lower falls the coeffi-
cients on legislative oversight. This find-
ing suggests that just an increase in num-
ber of political parties presented in the 
Parlianment does not lead to increase of 
legilslative oversight effectiveness. In op-
posite, the high number of political par-
ties may lead to constant clashes and dis-
putes and instability of the system. For 
instance, the researcher Amuvo empha-
sizes that during the general elections in 
2007, Nigeria had no fewer than 50 politi-
cal parties, many of them very small and 
with no pretentions of being able to fulfill 
the constitutional requirements, Parties 
are hardly present, let alone active on the 
ground. Members, on their part, are larg-
erly fictitious entities” (Lawson: 2010).  
Therefore, the general belief that a great-
er number of political parties lead to dem-
ocratic development sound rather naï ve. 
The study findings suggest that stability 
of party systems is an essential pre-
condition for legislative oversight effec-
tiveness. 
Our final regression has statistically 
significant results showing a negative re-
lationship between party system fluidity 
and WGI, which signifies that an increase 
in party systems fluidity leads to the de-
crease in all six WGI dimensions. These 
findings may serve as an additional con-
tribution to Pelizzo and Nwokora (2018) 
findings that: “unstable party systems un-
dermine the quality of democracy…
(therefore) stable party systems are de-
sirable, but some forms of system change 
are also beneficial to democratic quali-
ty.” (Pelizzo&Nwokora, 2018). 
Summarizing our finding needless to 
mention that in/stability of political party 
systems is quite an ambiguous notion.  
However, the Index of party systems flu-
idity elaborated by Nwokora & Pelizzo 
recently in 2015 may serve as a useful an-
alytic tool for capturing the dynamics of 
party system changes in different coun-
tries of the world. Certainly, legislative 
oversight and overall government effec-
tiveness depend on many factors, except 
the stability of party systems also from 
other political, economic and cultural fac-
tors. Summurizing, it is possible to agree 
with Giovanni Sartori that yet, party era 
does not begin as long as parties only ex-
ist for the notables, as a mere façade; it 
begins when the party becomes a stabi-
lized group which notable groups can no 
longer dissolve and abandon at their pres-
sure” (Sartori, 2005).  
Therefore, Duvergers “an atomistic 
nuclear” approach in studying parties and 
party systems as well as Sartori’s 
“Parteiraum” (party space) approach of 
viewing party systems as: “space of de-
facto of the interaction of political par-
ties” (Sartori, 2005) both are justified.  
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Our IPU dataset analysis have shown 
that Parliamentarians rarely address the 
Government and do not use the oversight 
capacity fully therefore many studies both 
qualitative and quantitative needs to be 
done to fill the exiting gap the literature in 
order to define those factors (political, 
economic and cultural) that hinder legis-
lative oversight effectiveness in Sub-
Saharan African countries. At the same 
time, it is also possible again to draw the 
attention of scholars to Index of party sys-
tem fluidity which allows the researchers 
to analyze the dynamics of party system 
change of different countries at different 
historical timeframes. Therefore, we be-
lieve it is possible to expect comparative 
studies capturing party system changes 




The article is structured in the fol-
lowing way, the first part analyzes how 
academic scholarship defines legislative 
oversight and party system fluidity. The 
second part presents our data analysis 
methods. In conclusion, the paper dis-
cusses the key findings of the research, 
namely the effects of party systems fluidi-
ty on legislative oversight and WGI, in the 
context of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
These findings reaffirm that the stability 
of political party systems is a crucial fac-
tor that is essential for the development 
of democratic institutions and further 
evolvement of mechanisms of democratic 
control of Parliaments over the work of 
national Governments.  
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